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**A JTF STAFF STRUCTURE FOR THE NEW MILLENIUM:
LEANER, FASTER, AND MORE RESPONSIVE**

by

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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Preface

If one has a new way of thinking, why not apply it wherever one's thought leads to? It is certainly entertaining to let oneself do so, but it is also very illuminating and capable of leading one to new and deep insights.

—Frank Oppenheimer, Physicist

Profound changes stalk today's military. Professional journal authors and current symposia speakers contemplate how technology may impact future battlespace functions. Other commentators predict effects from military force reductions on our future capabilities. Some thinkers seek innovative ways to describe future operations and to account for these changes in technology and structure. Professional Military Educators waver between teaching present realities and encouraging future visions. All of these authors, speakers, thinkers, and teachers exhort us, as the military at-large, to think hard about anticipated changes and plan for their integration.

I developed this thesis because I perceived a void in applying these themes—technology, force reductions, and futuristic visions—to command and control and to related impacts for staff structures. I seek concrete application of these ideas, rather than more rhetoric on what might be...someday. This paper represents my effort to peer into our future and see possibilities. At a minimum, I hope to stir ideas, and at best, I wish to contribute ideas worthy of testing in some future joint task force staff.

I remain indebted to my faculty research advisor, Dr. Michael Grumelli, for his candor, humor, and wise counsel throughout this project.

Abstract

Our military future will likely be radically different from our past. Consequently, military personnel can prepare for this future by investigating ways to adapt to novel challenges posed by new weapons, or new theories, or new organizations.

This paper explores the problem of how joint task force staffs should reorganize to improve future command and control, in order to meet demands of the most likely future environment. The research methodology consisted of a literature search from a broad body of evidence. Sources included business literature, studies by organizations such as the Center for Naval Analyses, and research papers produced by other students.

Several key changes envisioned for the military provide a foundation for the project and introduce future operational and environmental complexities. These changes include emerging international and national trends, such as increased MOOTW and growing military pressures to shrink but remain effective. Another trend, the “revolution in military affairs,” includes aspects like a “system of systems” and “dominant battlespace awareness.” Additionally, Joint Vision 2010 offers a conceptual view of future battlespace activities that are portrayed as markedly different from today’s activities. Against this backdrop of change, two primary reasons for using military staffs—information management and decision-making—open a path to the heart of the paper and serve as a frame of reference for new organizational designs.

Two metaphors offer vivid conceptual staff images. First, the “Spider Plant” metaphor depicts a multifaceted organization with a core structure and many outlying satellite organizations; illustrating the potential for semi-autonomous operations. Second, the “Brain” metaphor captures the essence of relationships between key organizational elements and shows natural applications of decentralized decisionmaking. The paper concludes with a discussion of benefits gained through reorganization: faster, more responsive operations and leaner structures.

Both metaphors strive to define essential relationships between staff elements. The overarching theme involves finding areas where commanders and staffs can decentralize operations to improve speed and responsiveness. Often this decentralized approach is enabled by technology, however the leaders must first be willing to let go of their control and learn to live in a complex environment—near the edge of chaos.

With a goal of stirring ideas for reorganization, this paper applies contemporary vision statements and thoughts to command and control and related staff structures. It demonstrates potential to improve operations by developing innovative ways to visualize staff interactions. The time has come to move beyond rhetoric about the future and to develop useful ways to prepare. This work provides one step along the path of innovation.

Chapter 1

Changes in Our Military Future

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.

—Guilio Douhet¹

Guilio Douhet, long acknowledged as an innovator and early airpower theorist, recognized a changing warfare environment and strove to meet its challenges. Douhet epitomizes a small minority of military professionals who are willing to invest their time contemplating what *might* be achieved. In 1947, Lieutenant General Gavin, former Commanding General of 82nd Airborne Division, described the military majority: “We professional soldiers are traditionally laggard in facing and adopting changes, especially radical changes that upset proven methods and the ways in which we have been doing things for years past.”² Emerging international and national changes will likely reach General Gavin’s “radical” threshold. US military leaders must adopt new strategies to stay relevant—starting at the highest levels of command.

Three broad changes loom on the US military horizon: emerging international and national trends, the “revolution in military affairs,” and Joint Vision 2010. Respectively, these changes describe the emerging operating environment, capabilities, and operational concepts affecting joint operations. Together, these issues present a complex mosaic against which current practices must be gauged.

Emerging International and National Trends

Speculation abounds for what the world's future holds. Widespread technology, rising nationalism, and growing economic and environmental interdependence all increase international complexities. These complexities often create situations in other regions requiring intervention. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) represent the most likely future interventions.

With respect to missions of the future, it would appear that within the residual, state-centric international system, conflicts among major powers will be the exception....Recent OOTW missions which have involved joint forces—in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Liberia—contrast sharply with the focus of the Cold War era and the regional conflict in the Gulf that immediately followed it. But in fact they have been the normal missions of the Armed Forces save for the historical anomaly of the Cold War.³

In terms of national trends, two unrelated circumstances converged within the US and resulted in increased military pressures which now affect operational considerations. First, the Soviet Union imploded, and with it went many US citizens' military defense concerns. These citizens want greater fiscal focus on domestic issues now. Second, the US conducted a massive, incredibly rapid, and relatively casualty free operation in the Middle East. Many citizens now perceive that all operations should be fast and clean. A continuing technology explosion further compounds these issues for the military.

“Revolution in Military Affairs”

“...RMA proffers three key instruments of national power: the *system of systems*, *extended information dominance*, and *information warfare*.⁴ The system of systems offers a glimpse at technology that empowers change in military operations. Key components within the system of systems include position reporting, surveillance, and

reconnaissance systems. Dominant battlespace awareness results from leveraging these capabilities to produce a common operational picture and from sharing information through networked communications. Military forces must harness these capabilities to achieve Joint Vision 2010.

Joint Vision 2010

“Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for how America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.”⁵ These emerging concepts rest upon the promises of information superiority and full spectrum dominance.

Information superiority serves as the foundation for full spectrum dominance. Fused all-source intelligence and enhanced command and control permit forces to gain information superiority. Next, forces must confront two challenges in seeking full spectrum dominance. First, they must embrace new technologies, and second, the individual warfighters must use initiative and creativity to maximize opportunities.

Admiral Jay Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, stated “The concepts outlined in *Joint Vision 2010* can multiply our combat power.... But the real challenge is in changing our way of thinking.”⁶ In order to change contemporary thinking about joint task force staff design, a crucial first step involves defining the future environment. Against a backdrop of pending military changes—emerging international and national trends, a “revolution in military affairs,” and Joint Vision 2010’s new operational concepts—the staff’s purpose and functions in this new future must be assessed.

Notes

¹ *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 15 (Spring 1997): Inside Front Cover.

² Lt Col Jay M. Parker, “Change and the Operational Commander,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 10 (Winter 1995/6): 92.

³ Lt Gen Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, “Emergence of the Joint Officer;” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 13 (Autumn 1996): 55.

⁴ Scott M. Fabbri and Adam B. Siegel, “JTF Operations from 1983-1993,” (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993), 9.

⁵ “Joint Vision 2010: America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow;” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 12 (Summer 1996): 35.

⁶ Adm Jay L. Johnson, “The Navy in Joint Vision 2010: A Joint Vision,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 14 (Winter 1996/7): 19.

Chapter 2

Need for Staffs

Joint force commanders are provided staffs to assist them in the decisionmaking and execution process. The staff is an extension of the commander; its sole function is command support, and its only authority is that which is delegated to it by the commander.

—Joint Publication 0-2¹

As military operations have grown in complexity, staff structures have also grown, until today when modern staffs represent monolithic organizations—bloated and distorted almost beyond recognition. Broad categories of modern staff elements include the “personal staff, special staff, and general or joint staff divisions.”² For the United Task Force (UNITAF) portion of Somalia relief operations, the JTF Somalia staff table of organization reflects 906 billets!³ This size seems to contradict Lieutenant General Cushman’s tenet which says, “Even as a commander directs modern war in all its complexity, he will want to keep his staff as small as possible, realizing that when minds are gifted he can get his job done better with fewer.”⁴ Surely military personnel are no less gifted than General Cushman believes...At its most elemental level, the staff purpose is twofold: to manage information on behalf of the commander and to assist the commander with decision-making functions. All other tasks tie to one of these purposes.

Information Management

“A staff is an aid to command. It serves to ease the commander’s workload by furnishing basic information and technical advice....”⁵ Situational awareness provided by the staff depends upon information—timely, accurate information. Staffs manage this information by processing it for the commander’s use and by sharing it with others. Processing converts data into knowledge and awareness, and cannot be overemphasized. Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (Director of US Navy Space, Information Warfare, and Command and Control) and John Garstka (Joint Staff J-6 Science and Technical Advisor) describe the benefit of information processing and link it to speed of command: “The force achieves information superiority, having a dramatically better awareness or understanding of the battlespace rather than simply more raw data. ...The results that follow are the rapid foreclosure of enemy courses of action and the shock of closely coupled events.”⁶ Awareness occurs after staffs gather and analyze data.

Gathering, Analysis, Presentation

Staffs process data to save commanders time and to translate technical material into usable form. Commanders have little time to deal with raw data. The “cognitive hierarchy” shown in Joint Pub 6 depicts information as data which has been processed in some way.⁷ Staffs primarily process information specifically sought by the commander.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. Commanders define information priorities to guide staff efforts. These priorities fall into two of three categories described as “Commander’s Critical Information Requirements.”⁸ Information about the enemy or environment becomes a priority intelligence requirement. Information about friendly forces becomes a friendly force information requirement.

These requirements focus staff collection and processing efforts in order to expedite information management duties and conserve resources. Some information, if excessively detailed or technical, merits translation.

Functional Translations. Staff members present information to the commander after rendering the material useful. This task may require describing information in layman's terms or depicting information graphically. A classic example involves weather reports. Rather than provide raw data or information facts about climatic conditions, weather reports present *USA Today*-style pictures with amplification about weather impacts to current operations. Staffs must use ingenuity like this to optimize information quality for commanders, and provide "understanding at a glance."

Information Sharing/Flow

The second aspect of information management involves disseminating information. While staffs predominantly manage information for their own commander, much information serves multiple organizations. Information sharing benefits others and can improve overall force efficiency. Too often, hierarchical organizations "control" information and impede access⁹. Information gains value when shared, and loses value when unnecessarily restricted. Shared information may travel in two directions within an organization, laterally or vertically.

Adjacent/Parallel. Information must move laterally within organizations.¹⁰ Typically adjacent or parallel elements represent similar structures—"sister units"—which may lack formal reporting relationships. Yet today, modern technology creates numerous options for lateral information sharing. Staffs must develop lateral information flow paths in order to optimize information resources. Additionally, lateral

communications provide redundancy when vertical communications experience outages.

In addition to “pure” lateral information flow, sophisticated networks may also incorporate diagonal information flow—simultaneously hierarchical and lateral.¹¹

Higher and Lower. Vertical relationships symbolize “normal” information flow paths within typical military hierarchies. Staffs ensure that subordinates receive potentially useful information as well as keeping higher headquarters informed.¹² Any staff reorganization must accommodate both information management and flow concerns.

Decisionmaking

A second principle staff task involves decision making. Although commanders remain ultimately responsible, they cannot realistically make all decisions. Consequently, commanders empower staff members to make decisions within certain limits. These decisions arise during both operational planning and execution.

Planning

Once operations commence, planning and execution occur simultaneously.¹³ As a result, commanders cannot stay fully engaged in planning because they must attend to execution. Staffs plan based upon commander’s intent, specific guidance, and their own situational awareness, and then translate approved plans into orders and action items.

COA Development. Staffs play a key planning role by “developing basic decisions into adequate plans, and anticipating future needs and drafting tentative plans to meet them.”¹⁴ Typically, course of action development involves dynamic collaboration by many functional specialists to create an optimal plan. As perhaps the most critical staff

function, course of action development represents the organization's bid to anticipate the future and prepare for success therein.

Course of action planners must remain closely associated with current operations' personnel to maintain overall operational coherence and to capitalize on successes. Joint Vision 2010 describes how the separation between planners and executors may narrow, and perhaps disappear altogether: "Real-time information will likely drive parallel, not sequential, planning and real-time, not prearranged, decisionmaking."¹⁵ Parallel planning may prove difficult for some whose sole experience involved linear planning efforts.

Orders Development. Planning staff responsibilities continue beyond plan approval and include "translating plans into orders, and transmitting them to subordinate commands."¹⁶ In some cases, this documentation includes whole annexes and appendices to voluminous written orders. Technology now permits paperless information transfer which may speed delivery. Additionally, graphic information may be shared more easily today. Future technology may eliminate a need for written orders—video and audio tapes may store records of planning results recorded during confirmation briefs, and electronic search and retrieval devices will lead a user to the desired plan section. In the interim, staff design must account for personnel who perform planning functions to include orders development and dissemination.

Execution

During operations, commanders need assistance monitoring the myriad of ongoing activities. Presently, a separate staff stands watch in an operations center and assists with decision-making activities.¹⁷ Staff members usually represent functional specialties of elements engaged in operations. These staff members perform two basic functions for

commanders. First, they monitor operations, making recommendations to modify plans and activities. Second, they coordinate support for subordinate units as requested.

Monitoring Operations. Staffs monitor activities of subordinate and adjacent elements for the commander, specifically to maintain optimal situational awareness for decisionmaking.¹⁸ Monitoring in its least intrusive form occurs when elements conduct operations and submit routine reports that the monitor uses to maintain awareness of current status and activities. A more intrusive form occurs when a monitor demands information updates from subordinate elements, despite having the latest updates already. Both the common operational picture and new information transfer techniques promise to improve situational awareness available to monitors.¹⁹

Coordinating Support. Coordination comprises the second function performed by operations center personnel. Staffs perform this function on behalf of subordinate elements, and it contributes to success of the force as a whole. In many cases, military organizations maintain parallel primary staff structures that coordinate within their narrow functional areas.²⁰ However smaller staffs may lack expertise found on higher staffs and may request support. Subordinate units may also funnel requests for information support through the monitor, as the operations center likely has the best situational awareness. Any reorganization scheme must account for adequate monitors, although fewer would suffice in a decentralized decisionmaking environment.

Modern technology offers improvements that enhance staff functions of information management and decision making. These improvements could also provide personnel savings. Computers enhance information gathering, analysis, and presentation. Communication capabilities and information transfer technologies provide means to

widely share information throughout a network—potentially eliminating layers. Automated decision-making tools offer potential to reduce human intervention in selected situations. Greater situational awareness achieved through the “system of systems” presents potential personnel savings within operations centers, as previously manual communication and plotting functions become automated. Additionally, networked telecommunications offer direct access from field units to specialists, possibly obviating the need for operations center personnel to coordinate support.

These advances could permit a greater span of control over widely dispersed forces by fewer personnel. However, Joint Vision 2010 clearly articulates the inherent challenge in bringing this about:

In order to make optimum use of the technologies and operational concepts discussed earlier, we must carefully examine the traditional criteria governing span of control and organizational layers for services, commands, and defense agencies. We will need organizations and processes that are agile enough to exploit emerging technologies and respond to diverse threats and enemy capabilities. As we move forward, we may require further reductions in supervision and centralized direction.²¹

As a result, the key to exploiting the full potential of these new technologies lies in the willingness of commanders to relinquish control. These technologies achieve little if commanders only use them to modernize current hierarchical command and control methods. The future demands a new and creative organizational approach.

Notes

¹ Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, 1995), x.

² AFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997*, (Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 1997), 2-45.

³ Maj Michael D. Wykoff, “Shrinking the JTF Staff: Can We Reduce The Footprint Ashore?” (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, 1996), 43.

Notes

⁴ Lt Gen John H. Cushman, *Thoughts for Joint Commanders*, (Annapolis, MD, August 1993), 15.

⁵ AFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide* 1997, 3-2.

⁶ V Adm Arthur K. Cebrowski and John Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," US Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 124/1/1, 139, (January 1998): 32.

⁷ Joint Pub 6-0, *Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations*, (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, 1995), I-4.

⁸ Field Manual 7-30, *The Infantry Brigade*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994), 3-6 to 3-8.

⁹ Gerald W. Hopple, "Air Force Command and Control: Assessment Criteria for Computer Based Decision Aiding Systems." 103, and Anthony J. Bohannan, "C3I in Support of the Land Commander," 183. In *Principles of Command and Control*. Edited by V Adm Jon L. Boyes and Dr. Stephen J. Andriole. (Washington, DC: AFCEA/Signal Magazine, 1987).

¹⁰ Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, IV-11.

¹¹ Lt Col Gregory A. Roman, "The Command or Control Dilemma: When Technology and Organizational Orientation Collide," Maxwell Paper No. 8, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1997), 15.

¹² Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, IV-10-11

¹³ Thomas P. Coakley, *Command and Control for War and Peace*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1991), 179.

¹⁴ AFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide* 1997, 3-2.

¹⁵ "Joint Vision 2010: America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow," 41.

¹⁶ AFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide* 1997, 3-2.

¹⁷ Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, IV-14.

¹⁸ Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, IV-14.

¹⁹ Cebrowski and Garstka, 32.

²⁰ AFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide* 1997, 2-50.

²¹ "Joint Vision 2010: America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow," 48.

Chapter 3

Reengineering the Staff

The military staff must be adequately composed: it must contain the best brains in the fields of land, air and sea warfare, propaganda war, technology, economics, politics and also those who know the peoples' life.

—General Erich von Ludendorff,
Total War (1935)¹

In his book *Seeing Organizational Patterns: A New Theory and Language of Organizational Design*, Robert Keidel asserts that “Organizations are inherently triadic because there are only three ways in which people can relate without conflict to each other...autonomy, control, and cooperation....”²




Figure 1. Organizational Design Tradeoffs³

He proposes that the “overwhelming tendency for management is to become obsessed with control,” and suggests that careful balance of the triadic variables offers a better alternative to close control.⁴ Figure 1 illustrates potential characteristics of each variable, and provides a means of assessing which variables prove more desirable.

Mr. Keidel then constructs multiple views of organizational interaction using these three variables. In one example, he defines organizational structures as a combination of three elements: organizational charts, physical layouts, and interdependence or work flow, and then he relates these elements to the triadic variables. When these structural elements interact in a matrix with the triadic variables, a number of relationships emerge.

	<u>Autonomy</u>	<u>Control</u>	<u>Cooperation</u>
<u>Organization Chart</u> (What is the form of our reporting relation?)	Flat/Clear	Steep/Clear	Flat/Amorphous
<u>Physical Layout</u> (What interaction does our physical design encourage?)	Independent Action	Programmed Interaction	Spontaneous Interaction
<u>Interdependence</u> (How does our work/information flow?)	Pooled	Sequential	Reciprocal

Figure 2. Organizational Structures Superimposed on Triadic Variables⁵

For military operations the ideal reporting relation is probably a “Flat/Clear” format because this relation permits rapid responses. However present reporting chains more resemble the “Steep/Clear” configuration of a control structure. Preferred physical layouts ought to encourage the “Spontaneous Interaction” shown under “Cooperation,” to maximize contributions of all elements. Additionally, “Reciprocal” work and information flow between force elements represents an ideal arrangement for military planning and execution to capitalize on the speed of direct exchanges. To incorporate

these ideas, the challenge becomes designing an organizational structure that balances the triadic variables to keep the favorable relationships identified here.

A further venture into contemporary literature provides numerous design choices. Among those, Gareth Morgan's works abound with wildly imaginative examples. Mr. Morgan stresses visualization and metaphors as a means to understand organizational interactions. He explains metaphor characteristics:

Metaphor is often regarded just as a device for embellishing discourse, but its significance is much greater than this. The use of metaphor implies a way of thinking and a way of seeing that pervade how we understand our world generally. ...Metaphor is inherently paradoxical. It can create powerful insights that also become distortions, as the way of seeing created through a metaphor becomes a way of not seeing.⁶

A machine metaphor describes one traditional view of the military. Mr. Morgan describes how Frederick the Great adjusted his machine to improve efficiency: "And to ensure that the military machine was used as wisely as possible, he developed the distinction between advisory and command functions, freeing specialist advisors (staff) from the line of command to plan activities."⁷ Today we continue to use specialist advisors in much the same way as historical military leaders like Frederick the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte. Technology, however, has advanced well beyond the imaginings of these leaders and offers fantastic opportunities for change. Two promising metaphors for change are the spider plant and the brain.

"Spider Plant" Metaphor

The spider plant provides a very powerful image for a joint task force staff. The "parent plant" represents the operations centers (future and current). The "baby plants" or

offspring represent all of the agencies, boards, and centers participating in the operation. Each offspring maintains ties to the parent via a cord representing some relationship.

Parent Plant

As noted, the parent plant symbolizes the core of the staff. Most often the core includes the future and current operations centers where near-term planning and execution monitoring take place. All other elements – the offspring – feed information to the core and receive support from it.

Relationships. The parent plant defines relationships to and from offspring. Depending upon the nature of the offspring, these relationships may differ from one to another. The German military concept of *auftragstaktik* fits nicely here, in that the parent defines the offspring's mission and end state through mission-type orders and commander's intent. The offspring endeavors to conduct its mission semi-autonomously, while retaining a link to the parent for information flow and support. Gareth Morgan describes his vision of this mutual support.

The understanding and agreements struck through this kind of “cord dialogue” are crucial in creating a shared frame of reference through which the “pot” and “offshoots” can operate in harmony *without direct control*. Whenever one engages in decentralized activity, there is always a danger of the decentralized units lurching in directions that violate the spirit or principles of the enterprise as a whole. The bureaucrat tries to protect against this by minimizing the space for maneuver through the creation of hierarchy, rules, and top-down management. The umbilical cord manager looks to shared understandings as a means of creating integration while *maximizing* the space, autonomy, and self-organizing capacities of the units being controlled. Minimum, rather than maximum, specifications and controls are the order of the day.⁸

The spider plant metaphor offers opportunities to establish two desired aspects of Robert Keidel's theory: “Flat/Clear” reporting relationships and “Reciprocal” information flow.

Support. The parent provides essential support to offspring while permitting them freedom of action. Rather than higher headquarters perceiving itself as the supported element, a spider plant metaphor reinforces the concept of a parent caring for its offspring—ensuring they have needed support. Mr. Morgan suggests five potential arrangements between the parent and offspring⁹:

1. A shared sense of overall vision and values.
2. Agreement on accountabilities.
3. Resource flows in both directions.
4. Information systems.
5. Rewards.

These links demonstrate the significant support aspect from the parent to the offspring, as well as a unifying vision for achieving responsiveness through auftragstaktik.

Offspring

Offspring of a JTF staff include agencies, boards, and centers. In his research paper about shrinking the footprint of joint task force staffs, Major Wykoff reveals the potential magnitude of these staff elements.

Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni, commanding general of I Marine Expeditionary Force, U. S. Marine Corps, has identified about one hundred integrated staff cells that JTF commanders can select from and establish in theater for specialized tasks. An integrated staff cell is a functional organization as opposed to the traditional staff section that performs a group of related tasks.¹⁰

In addition to those integrated staff cells listed in Appendix A, subordinate task forces command posts, service component command posts, and functional component operation centers also represent potential offspring. For coalition operations, this list becomes even larger. A Center for Naval Analyses study identified nine categories of elements, outside of the joint task force, with whom a joint force commander may need to coordinate:¹¹

1. Foreign militaries
2. US govt agencies (DOS,FEMA...)
3. Ad-hoc US govt interagency teams
4. US embassies and country teams
5. Multinational organizations (UN, NATO) religious...)
6. Foreign govts/agencies
7. NGO's (ICRC, Dr.'s w/out borders...)
8. Corporations
9. Non-govt local leaders (tribe, warlord,

The sheer size of this organization demands a new way of thinking about military operations and control, especially when leveraged by technology. The multitude of interacting elements demands those cooperative aspects in Robert Keidel's theory regarding "Spontaneous Interaction" and "Reciprocal" information flow.

Semi-autonomous Operations. The complexity of modern operations, with potentially one hundred offspring contributing to a mission, creates a broad span of control requirement for the joint force commander. Often clumping elements under principal staff directorates reduces this burden. This clumping technique proved ineffective for several recent MOOTW operations: JTF Sea Angel personnel (Bangladesh) reported blurring between J-2 and J-3 functions;¹² JTF Gtmo personnel (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) revealed blurring between J-3 and J-4 functions and difficulty defining J-2 tasks;¹³ and JTF Provide Promise personnel (Bosnia) also identified blurring of responsibility between the J-2 and J-3.¹⁴ Additionally, two functional component commands (STRATCOM and TRANSCOM) presently combine the J-3 and J-4 into a single department.¹⁵ These examples of functional overlap and ambiguities spark a question about continued utility of the conventional staff model.

Whether offspring monitoring occurs through the joint operations center or by principal staff cells, one might conclude that contemporary operations ought to be

decentralized. With so many elements, only decentralization provides flexibility to react quickly and exploit fleeting opportunities. Joint Vision 2010 suggests this possibility.

The implications of improved systems integration are both profound and complex. New technologies will allow increased capability at lower echelons to control more lethal forces over larger areas, thus leveraging skills and initiative of individuals and small units. These capabilities could empower a degree of independent maneuver, planning, and coordination at lower echelons, which were normally exercised by more senior commanders in the past.¹⁶

In turn, decentralization may permit joint force commanders to field smaller staff elements, as the demands upon the staff to “control” operations lessen.

“Bumblebees.” One requirement levied through decentralized operations arises as a need for networked information exchange between operational elements, support elements, and staff elements. Mr. Morgan describes two means of making synergy and integration occur between offspring. One method involves writing requirements into the cord relationships. Under Keidel’s organizational structure theory in Figure 2, this notion of writing requirements appears to fit a “Control” technique leading to “Programmed Interaction” with “Sequential” work and information flow. These relationships were rejected earlier in favor of the “Cooperation” technique which allows “Spontaneous Interaction” and “Reciprocal” work and information flow. A “bumblebee” metaphor supports the latter technique, permitting free information flow and interaction.

One practical example of a bumblebee is a liaison officer. Because the liaison works for the sending unit, that unit can also require the liaison to coordinate with multiple agencies, moving from unit to unit (plant to plant) in the operations area. In another example, support flights from the United States to the theater may perform a bumblebee function by carrying essential materiel and personnel. Military forces seem predisposed to carry as many people and things as possible into the theater. This attitude proves

wasteful. In the future, a first response ought to involve liaison bumblebees and electronic connectivity for all elements that need not physically reside in theater.

The spider plant metaphor offers an example of picturing the joint task force as a collection of discrete elements. By viewing each element and its relationship to the parent plant as a separate and unique occurrence, planners may recognize ways to streamline the staff by leaving some elements at home. Defining these relationships also helps determine missions for each discrete element, which should allow leaders to better decide how many personnel should deploy – rather than a typical response to take everyone and sort the situation on the ground.... Moving away from the spider plant, a quite different way to view the joint task force involves using a “brain” analogy.

“Brain” Metaphor

In another metaphor to describe a modern organization, Gareth Morgan reports “Organizations are information systems. They are communication systems. And they are decision-making systems. We can thus go a long way toward understanding them as information processing brains.”¹⁷ This particular metaphor proves useful in assessing relationships between the joint task force core staff and other elements.

Two Hemispheres

The brain’s two hemispheres share one shell. They perform complementary functions. If the corpus callosum that joins the hemispheres is severed, the brain continues to perform but integrated functioning is lost.¹⁸ For example, language functions typically reside in the left hemisphere. A picture presented to the right eye will cross to the left hemisphere and can be verbally identified. A picture presented to the left

eye crosses into the right hemisphere which is language deficient. Upon questioning, the subject will not be able to identify the object presented to the left eye. This example illustrates a potential pitfall in separating the two hemispheres of the core staff, the future and current operations sections. Assume that situational awareness represents language capacity. The current operations section acts as the left hemisphere and controls situational awareness. Important information presented to the future operations section may mean nothing, because that section lacks capacity for situational awareness when separated from current operations.

At a minimum, future operations and current operations staffs should be located, as far as possible, within one open facility. Joint Vision 2010 suggests one driver for this arrangement: “Real-time information will likely drive parallel, not sequential, planning and real-time, not prearranged, decisionmaking.”¹⁹ Only when these two hemispheres of the joint task force brain fully integrate can modern joint task forces realize the synergy afforded by the revolution in military affairs. Ultimately, if the Joint Vision 2010 prediction comes true, then these two sections will merge into one unit.

Future Operations. Under a three-tiered planning and execution model, future plans conducts mid-range to far-term planning, future operations conducts near-term planning, and current operations monitors execution and conducts reactive planning. This model epitomizes linear planning and execution. To capitalize on technological advances and promises of faster tempo operations, this linearity must change. One means to initiate this change occurs through co-location of future and current operations. Future operations planners must maintain up-to-the-minute situational awareness to produce viable plans that seamlessly meld with current operations.

Current Operations. An inverse relationship exists for the current operations staff. These personnel, who conduct reactive planning during operations, benefit from insight about the future operations under consideration. This insight may permit reactive planning to lead the operations into a natural blending with future operations' plans.

The present, separated physical design leads to "Control" characterizations under Keidel's theory, which include "Programmed Interactions" and "Sequential" information flows. The desired relationship, "Spontaneous Interaction" with "Reciprocal" work and information flows, occurs when both hemispheres habitually share one shell.

Nervous Systems

James Schneider, Professor of Military Theory at the School of Advanced Military Studies, observed in a recent article that "Command and staff processes are basically poor models of the brain and nervous system."²⁰ In the human body, the brain acts through the central and peripheral nervous systems. These systems receive information from the periphery and act upon it. When compared to a military organization, the external elements beyond the future and current operations centers (brain) represent the input agents sending signals to and receiving information from the brain. As noted with the spider plant metaphor, multitudes of external elements exist in contemporary operations.

Information Exchange. The brain possesses a capacity to rapidly signal the body, through a vast network of nerve cells. Emergencies often demand flash responses from reflexes throughout the body. In these cases critical information hastens to all locations. Modern information technology provides capability to achieve that same effect throughout a dispersed organization.

Gareth Morgan describes this capability using a hologram analogy. “Information technology also has holographic characteristics in that it has the capacity to spread information and intelligence throughout a system so that people can be integrated even though they are far apart, because they possess the knowledge and intelligence to act on behalf of the whole.”²¹ Organizations networked by information technologies can mimic the nervous system, and develop capacities to respond quickly and with unity of effort.

One limitation to implementing the brain model lies in hierarchical mindsets. Rapid, flexible response occurs only when information travels directly from the “senses” to the location most needing the information. Conventional staff structures potentially limit information sharing by slowing information flow or blocking it altogether.

Decentralized Reactions. A related issue deals with having the authority to respond when information reveals a need to act quickly. In the nervous system, certain stimuli cause immediate responses, before the brain even processes the signal. Pain reactions offer one example. Military organizations could benefit from adopting a similar technique—decentralized decision making. Such responses capitalize upon fleeting opportunities, achieving the promise of the “revolution in military affairs.”

Professor Schneider discusses the potentiality for a force to act autonomously: “A joint force...may suffer complete cybernetic collapse—the analog to a broken neck—but spontaneously reorganize at lower echelons and continue with its mission. The efficacy of the German idea of *auftragstaktik* is based on the self-organizing ability of subordinate leaders and units.”²² Military decentralization, based upon a mission statement, commander’s intent, and end state, permits speed and flexibility, and also limits dependence upon critical nodes.

Military leaders often shy away from decentralization because such operations tend to become disorderly—and the military abhors disorder. Complexity theory suggests that order emerges from seeming chaos if we look for it. Mr. Keidel lends perspective to this concern by relating his triadic variables—control, cooperation, and order—to chaos and complexity. “In short, complexity theory argues that there is a third realm, complexity, or the ‘edge of chaos’ that represents a transition state between order and chaos....In terms of triangular design, complexity parallels cooperation, order parallels control, and chaos parallels autonomy.”²³ Decentralized operations, favoring cooperation over pure autonomy, hover at the edge of chaos. While staffs strive to hold operations closer to complexity than chaos, they should remain flexible in cases where autonomy becomes necessary, recognizing that elements will self-organize to meet new demands.

Gareth Morgan’s metaphors offer powerful tools in which to examine organizations and seek fresh understandings of their dynamics. Two metaphors—the spider plant and brain—provide value in assessing relationships between a core element and many peripheral elements. At the heart of this discussion lies the promise of information technologies, upon which staff interactions may move to new levels of cooperation.

Creativity remains essential for change and improvement. In the book *Classics of Organizational Theory*, James Champy and Michael Hammer describe the modernization process: “Reengineering is about innovation. It is about exploiting the latest capabilities of technology to achieve entirely new goals. One of the hardest parts of reengineering lies in recognizing the new unfamiliar capabilities of technology instead of its familiar ones.”²⁴ Military reorganization, using the spider plant and brain metaphors and

embracing enabling technologies, demonstrates essential creativity and yields two benefits for future warfighting: faster, more responsive operations and leaner structures.

Notes

¹ Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, IV-11.

² Robert W. Keidel, *Seeing Organizational Patterns: A New Theory and Language of Organizational Design*, (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1995), 6.

³ Ibid., 11.

⁴ Ibid., 7.

⁵ Ibid., 65-66.

⁶ Gareth Morgan, *Images of Organization*, 2nd ed., (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997), 4-5.

⁷ Ibid., 16-17.

⁸ Gareth Morgan, *Imaginization: New Mindsets for Seeing, Organizing, and Managing*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997) 78.

⁹ Ibid., 77.

¹⁰ Wykoff, 23-24.

¹¹ Fabbri and Siegel, 10.

¹² Ibid., 108-109.

¹³ Ibid., 126.

¹⁴ Ibid., 181.

¹⁵ AFSC Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997*, 2-39 to 2-40.

¹⁶ "Joint Vision 2010: America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow," 40.

¹⁷ Morgan, *Images of Organization*, 78-79.

¹⁸ Dr. Eric Chudler, "Neuroscience for Kids – Hemispheres," On line. Internet, 26 September 1997. Available from <http://weber.u.washington.edu/~chudler/split.html>.

¹⁹ "Joint Vision 2010: America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow," 41.

²⁰ James J. Schneider, Professor of Military Theory, School of Advanced Military Studies. "Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity and the Promise of Information Warfare;" *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 15, (Spring 1997): 23.

²¹ Morgan, *Imaginization*, 10.

²² Schneider, 28.

²³ Keidel, 137.

²⁴ James Champy and Michael Hammer, "Reengineering the Corporation: The Enabling Role of Information Technology." Harper Collins Publishers, Inc, 1993, Reprinted as essay # 48 by Ott, Steven J. and Jay M. Shafritz, *Classics of Organizational Theory*, 4th ed., (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1996), 607.

Chapter 4

Reorganization Benefits

With exponentially exploding technology in weapons and our ability to process information, the ability to optimize the command and control structure will take on even greater importance. Herein lies one of the great challenges we face in the continuing development of joint doctrine. We must optimize a commander's ability to focus a growing resource base while enhancing his ability to deal with an increasingly complex set of tasks and conditions.

—C. C. Krulak,
Commandant of the Marine Corps¹

Reorganizing joint task force staffs with a more direct relationship between elements offers several benefits. First, operations become faster, when streamlining eliminates layers made obsolete through technology and new operational concepts. Second, leaner structures enhance force protection by lowering the number of personnel, agencies, boards, and centers (targets) in a theater. Finally, the restructured staff permits decentralized decisionmaking and information sharing needed for Joint Vision 2010.

Faster, More Responsive Operations

Information technologies promise faster, more responsive operations. This effect will result from decentralized decisionmaking, enabled by capabilities like cooperative engagement targeting, sensor-to-shooter reporting, in-transit visibility, and so on. These capabilities eliminate the need for some layers presently arrayed in the military command

and control structure, such as Control and Reporting Centers or intermediate logistics nodes. Additionally, networked information sharing will permit quicker operational support through near-real-time agency interactions.

Decentralized Decisionmaking

Increasing volumes of current military literature call for decentralized decision making. Modern military thinking emphasizes getting inside an enemy's decision cycle (Boyd's Observe, Orient, Decide, Act loop²) through faster tempo. Hierarchical organizations cannot achieve decision speeds necessary to achieve this goal, especially in very dynamic, chaotic MOOTW scenarios. Two distinguished US Military Academy personnel, Lieutenant General Howard Graves (former superintendent) and Don Snider (Olin Professor of National Security Studies), commented on this issue in MOOTW missions such as Somalia. "Most OOTW missions have also called for decentralized mission execution. This dispersion requires greater political-military sophistication in younger officers, to include direct contact with the media, non-governmental organizations, and foreign governments, as well as coping with the inherent ambiguities and complexities of such international operations."³

Using the spider plant metaphor, offspring require authority to act without need for consultation with the parent plant. Predefined arrangements, such as rules of engagement, a shared sense of overall vision and values, and agreement on accountabilities, provide the basis for at-the-scene decisionmaking. Unpredictable situations, like MOOTW, require maximum latitude for military personnel in contact with the local population. In an environment of weak or non-existent government and law enforcement, military personnel need freedom for rapid response in potential

cauldrons of volatile activity. Freedom of action permits speed and flexibility to achieve Joint Vision 2010 goals of dominant maneuver and precision engagement.

Dominant Maneuver. Through the improved situational awareness provided by the common operating picture, field units better locate gaps or weaknesses and exploit dominant maneuver⁴. This maneuver may occur in a classic warfighting sense, to interject forces between adversaries in a peace operation, or in a supporting role for humanitarian assistance relief distribution. In dispersed operations like MOOTW, many military elements move in a large area. Each element needs decision-making independence for dominant maneuver. Intervening agencies between units and an operations center add little value for rapid operations.

Precision Engagement. Likewise, a force seeking to engage a fleeting target requires instant response. Direct communication from sensor-to-shooter proves essential for precision engagement of mobile targets. Intervening command layers slow perishable information. For targets of opportunity encountered by the force, decentralized decisionmaking permits rapid and flexible engagement.

Information Decentralization

Besides decision making, commanders must also decentralize information. The value in this arrangement was previously discussed for dominant maneuver and precision engagement. However information decentralization also enables the other two Joint Vision 2010 concepts: focused logistics and full dimensional protection.

Focused Logistics. Focused logistics benefit from networked users and suppliers. Wal-Mart provides a superb example of this concept within the civilian sector.

Wal-Mart has developed a significant competitive edge by reducing its cost of sales to two to three percentage points below the industry average.

Wal-Mart was able to achieve this edge by making the shift to network-centric operations and translating information superiority into competitive advantage. Realizing that it had grown past the point where it could cost-effectively synchronize supply and demand from the top down, the company over time set up a sophisticated operational architecture – consisting of a sensory capability and a transaction grid—to generate a higher level of awareness within its retail ecosystem. Point-of-sale scanners—part of the sensor grid—collect information on the 90 million transactions that take place each week. This information is shared with suppliers in near real time, so they are able to better control production and distribution, as well as manage their own supply chains. ...This degree of self-synchronization emerged from the co-evolution of organization and process.⁵

Military forces could benefit from such a direct, responsive support system. An essential component lies in decentralized, networked information throughout the operations area.

Full Dimensional Protection. Military forces today place increased emphasis on force protection. Success requires both decentralized information and decision making. All forces engaged in protection operations need the most current situational awareness, as well as direct cueing from sensors whenever possible. Considering air-to-surface and surface-to-surface missile speeds, force protection forces must operate with a high degree of autonomy. Excessive layering in this mission could result in dead Americans and mission failure. James Champy and Michael Hammer, authors of an article about technology's enabling role in reorganization, offer one view: "The costs of hierarchical decisionmaking, however, are now too high to bear. Modern database technology allows information previously available only to management to be widely accessible."⁶

Military forces must capitalize on the speed and responsiveness generated by information technology. Hierarchies and "stove-pipes" prevent realization of Joint Vision 2010. Conversely, operational benefits of reorganizing joint task force staffs using the spider plant and brain metaphor result in faster, more responsive operations.

Leaner Structures

Another benefit of joint task force staff reorganization emerges as leaner structures. Deploying fewer personnel to a theater potentially reduces risk, assuming that personnel left at home are not the force protection or security elements. Smaller footprints conserve resources all around and also reduce personnel tempo. Leaner structures occur by eliminating elements without direct troop or asset control, using reach-back capability for routine support, and eliminating intervening command and control agencies.

Reduced Layers

“Organizations are rarely established as ends in themselves. They are instruments created to achieve other ends. This is reflected in the origins of the word organization, which derives from the Greek organon, meaning a tool or instrument.”⁷ One of the great military challenges ahead lies in eliminating unnecessary command and staff layers. The military must grapple with very real issues such as how to train and evaluate commanders without command opportunities at various ranks. Additionally, the military places great value in “real-world” operational experience – which tends to unnaturally swell staff sizes. To reorganize successfully, the military must escape the bonds of its culture, and then make hard choices about exactly what staff structure best meets future needs.

Intermediate HQ and Agencies. Technology permits increased span of control and wider coordination between elements, thereby obviating a need for any element that lacks a direct role in operations. The most obvious place to test this theory is within land forces. These forces use many layers to reduce span of control to between three and five elements per command level. Such hierarchical layering will likely be detrimental for future rapid decisionmaking, and would be pointless for information sharing in a highly

networked environment. The civilian sector already noted this byproduct of advanced technology: “Information technology, used imaginatively, has eliminated the need for separate, fully formed field units with their own overheads.... Wireless data communication goes further and begins to eliminate the need for field offices entirely.”⁸

Reach-back Capability. Telecommunications offer reach-back capabilities from theater to a home station. Support and services can now be coordinated without carrying an entire organization to the operations area. Gareth Morgan describes this environment:

...as information technology catapults us into the reality of an Einsteinian world where old structures and forms of organization dissolve and at times become almost invisible, the old approach no longer works. Through the use of telephone, fax, electronic mail, computers, video, and other information technology, people and their organizations are becoming disembodied. They can act as if they are completely connected while remaining far apart. They can have an instantaneous global presence. They can transcend traditional barriers of space and time, continually creating and re-creating themselves through changing networks of interconnections based on “real time” communication.⁹

Using the spider plant metaphor, a joint task force could “create and recreate” itself in each phase of an operation, based upon the capabilities and services it needed then. From the outset some offspring would co-locate with the parent plant, but others—perhaps many others—could remain home. Regardless of location, the cord arrangements still exist between elements. This vision demands trust from commanders, a belief that elements not under physical control will respond with the same urgency as if deployed.

Fewer C2 Agencies

In addition to savings from eliminated headquarters and non-deployed staff elements, further savings may result from reduced command and control agencies. Presently, command and control agencies provide functional planning, supervision, and assistance to joint task force elements. Aviation command and control provides an example.

Aircraft flying in support of ground forces may be required to communicate with as many as four agencies enroute to the terminal controller.¹⁰ The pilot first checks out with his local organization as he departs the field. Then he clears through air traffic control until away from the traffic pattern. Next the pilot clears with the local air defense/air control agency that ensures safe passage through friendly air defenses. Finally, the pilot talks to the air support coordinating agency that then directs him to a terminal controller. No single agency provides overall command and control of air operations; each is subordinate to a command center. Military forces leveraging new technologies ought to be able to combine these agencies and streamline operations significantly. Several spider plant offspring graft together to form a new, smaller offspring. Subsequent savings also reduce risk by reducing footprint, and lower personnel tempo and cost. Logistics organizations may realize similar savings with capabilities like total asset visibility.

Direct Connectivity. Additional structure savings may accrue from sensor-to-shooter technologies that directly link critical elements.¹¹ In situations where fairly clear rules of engagement exist, or where specific threats pose little danger, certain agencies may not be needed. For example, in a low aircraft-threat environment, agencies that oversee ground-based air defense units may not be needed. Combat air patrols may provide adequate defense from “air-breathing” threats. Thus, ground-based air defenses may provide only missile defense which presents much clearer engagement criteria or rules of engagement, and therefore eliminates a need for a supervising coordination agency. This modified structure reduces footprint and conserves resources.

Improved Situational Awareness. Technology advances such as the common operational picture may also eliminate some redundant command and control agencies by

allowing all services to share a picture. Previously, some agencies deployed in order to translate computerized information for other agencies. As an example, the Marine tactical air operations center provides a capability to translate a data link – NATO Link 1—to and from forces that lack the proper equipment. Whether or not the agency was needed from a command and control perspective, it had deployed simply to serve as a data link conduit.¹² The common operational picture will permit timely and direct situational awareness for all, rather than only those with highly specialized equipment.

Many benefits accrue from redesigning the joint task force staff. Rising highest among these is the capability to conduct faster, more responsive operations—both for combat and for support. In fact, only by reorganizing will joint task forces achieve the objectives set forth in Joint Vision 2010. An additional benefit includes risk reduction through fewer assets deployed to theater. Fewer deploying forces may also translate to reduced personnel tempo. A smaller footprint in theater results in resource conservation and this translates to fiscal savings as well. Finally, fewer deployed forces enhance the military's ability to respond to multiple, simultaneous operations.

Abundant reasons exist to redesign joint task force staffs. The challenge now arises in convincing the military “old guard” to relinquish many long-held conceptions and cultural norms. “Admiral William A. Owens, the former Vice Chairman, indicated that ‘the problem with deep, fast, and rampant innovation is not getting people to accept the new but to relinquish the old.’”¹³ The military must move beyond rhetoric about change and implement it. Restructuring joint task force staffs provides a great starting point.

Notes

¹ Gen Charles C. Krulak, "Doctrine for Joint Force Integration," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 14 (Winter 1996/7): 21.

² Col John R. Boyd, "Organic Design for Command and Control," *A Discourse on Winning and Losing*, Unpublished briefing papers, May 1987, 7.

³ Graves and Snider, 55.

⁴ "Joint Vision 2010: America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow," 42-43.

⁵ Cebrowski and Garstka, 30.

⁶ Champy and Hammer, 614.

⁷ Morgan, *Images of Organization*, 15.

⁸ Champy and Hammer, 613-614.

⁹ Morgan, *Imaginization*, 8.

¹⁰ Maj Lisa A. Row, Personal experience, Marine Tactical Air Operations Center (1984-1989) and Marine Tactical Air Command Center (1993-1994).

¹¹ "Joint Vision 2010: America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow," Page 42.

¹² Row, Personal experience, 1984-1989 and 1993-1994.

¹³ Capt James Stavridis, "The Second Revolution," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 15 (Spring 1997): 13.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

New conditions require... new and imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past.

—General Douglas MacArthur

Five recommendations emerge from this study. First, the unified commanders must demand that services exploit information technologies to provide reliable reach-back capabilities. With such capabilities, serious discussion and experimentation can begin with respect to which staff elements really need to deploy. Some staff elements can provide service from the United States, and this arrangement ought to become the normal situation. Benefits include risk reduction and cost reduction – both monetary and personnel.

Second, unified commanders must insist that joint training include decentralized operations in order to develop confidence among leaders at all levels. Senior leadership must begin to trust their junior leaders to conduct successful operations without close control and monitoring. Junior leaders must develop self confidence in an environment of decreased control, and they must learn to open communication upwards without fears of over-control by seniors. This change requires cultural shifts from “control” and “order” to “cooperation” and “complexity.” Without this change, Joint Vision 2010 remains a dream without substance.

Third, unified commanders must compel services to invest in information technologies until information networks span the battlespace. Decentralized operations will lose potential without the capability to share a common operational picture. Additionally, joint training in lateral information sharing must occur regularly. Only when all forces are interconnected can true synergy and cooperation occur.

Fourth, unified commanders must insist that streamlining of military structures occurs. This aspect likely poses the most painful and contentious issue for services to undertake. Hierarchical structures are inefficient for the environment envisioned and must be eliminated.

Fifth, unified commanders must train with planning and execution cells occupying the same spaces and operating as one staff. With increased information flows and the common operational picture, parallel planning and execution can become a reality. This real-time decision making will be needed to meet goals of dominant maneuver and precision engagement.

“If the motives for change are present, and if failing to implement effective responses to change risks national disaster, why do militaries not implement effective change and how much of this failure is the responsibility of commanders?”¹ As the United States’ warfighters, unified commanders must move Joint Vision 2010 from concept to practice. This nation can no longer afford the status quo. The time will never be better to redesign joint task force staffs for a new millenium.

Notes

¹ Parker, 91.

Appendix A

JTF Integrated Staff Cells¹

PERSONNEL

Joint Reception Center
EPW Management Board
Joint Awards Board
MWR Commission

INTELLIGENCE

Joint Intelligence Center
or Support Element
National Intel Support Team
Joint Collections Board/SARC
Joint Crypto Resource Board
Joint Reserve Intelligence Center
Joint Interrogation Facility
Joint Document Exploitation Center

OPERATIONS

Force Fires Planning/Coordination Center
Joint Targeting Coordination Board
Combat Operations Center
Future Operations Cell
Rear Area Operations Center
Civil-Military Operations Center
Security Assessment Team
Doctrine & Documentation Cell
JULLS Team
Special Operations Team
Joint Search and Rescue Center

LOGISTICS

Joint Movement Control Center
Joint Aviation Log Support Board
Joint Material Priority Allocation Board
Joint Mortuary Affairs Board

Joint Contracting Board
Joint Petroleum Board
Joint Facilities Utilization Board
Joint Logistics Coordination Board
Logistics Readiness Center

PLANS

Future Plans Cell
Operational Planning Team
Political-Military Group

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command Coordination Cell
Joint Communication Control Center

MEDICAL

Joint Disease Control Board
Joint Medical Control Board
Health Service Support Board
Joint Blood Program Office
Joint Patient Movement Request Center

OTHER

ROE Commission
Joint Information Bureau
Info Mgmt Tech Advisory/Anal Board
Joint Visitors Bureau

Notes

¹ Wykoff, 25.

Glossary

Joint Vision 2010 - Dominant maneuver. Dominant maneuver will be the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint land, sea, air, and space forces to accomplish assigned operational tasks. Dominant maneuver will allow our forces to gain a decisive advantage by controlling the breadth, depth, and height of the battlespace.¹

Joint Vision 2010 – Precision engagement. Precision engagement will consist of a system of systems that enables our forces to locate an objective or target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess the level of success, and retain the flexibility to reengage with precision when required. Even from extended ranges, precision engagement will allow us to shape battlespace, enhancing the protection of our forces.²

Joint Vision 2010 – Full Dimensional Protection. The primary prerequisite for full dimensional protection will be control of the battlespace to ensure forces can maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver, and engagement, while providing multi-layered defenses for forces and facilities at all levels. Full dimensional protection will enable effective employment of our forces while degrading opportunities for an enemy. It will be essential, in most cases, for gaining and maintaining the initiative required to execute decisive operations. The concept will be proactive, incorporating both offensive and defensive actions that may extend well into areas of enemy operations.³

Joint Vision 2010 – Focused Logistics. Focused logistics will be the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while en route, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations. It will be fully adaptive to the needs of our increasingly dispersed and mobile forces, providing support in hours or days versus weeks. Focused logistics will enable joint forces of the future to be more mobile, versatile, and projectable from anywhere in the world.⁴

Joint Vision 2010 – Full Spectrum Dominance. Each of these operational concepts will reinforce the others and will allow us to achieve massed effects in warfare from more dispersed forces. That is, taken together these four new concepts will enable us to dominate the full range of military operations from humanitarian assistance, through peace operations, up to and into the highest intensity conflict.⁵

Notes

¹ “Joint Vision 2010: America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow,” 42.

² Ibid., 43.

Notes

³ Ibid., 44.

⁴ Ibid., 44.

⁵ Ibid., 46.

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